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Abstract—RFID has been widely used in today’s commercial
and supply chain industry, due to the significant advantages
it offers and the relatively low production cost. However, this
ubiquitous technology has inherent problems in security and
privacy. This calls for the development of simple, efficient and
cost effective mechanisms against a variety of security threats.
This paper proposes a two-step authentication protocol based on
the randomized hash-lock scheme proposed by S. Weis in 2003.
By introducing additional measures during the authentication
process, this new protocol proves to enhance the security of
RFID significantly, and protects the passive tags from almost
all major attacks, including tag cloning, replay, full-disclosure,
tracking, and eavesdropping. Furthermore, no significant changes
to the tags is required to implement this protocol, and the
low complexity level of the randomized hash-lock algorithm is
retained.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), as the name sug-
gests, is a method of identification utilizing the transmission
and reception of electromagnetic or electrostatic radio waves
[1]. The technology stems from the principle of remote storage
and retrieval of data, using devices called transponders and
readers. In its simplest form, the transponder, commonly in
the form of a tag, emits radio signals when it is within the
range of the electromagnetic field generated by the reader [2].
The reader then picks up the relevant signal, which contains
information about the object attached to the tag [3] [4].
The potential advantages, including cost savings, brought
possible by the use of RFID would likely make RFID tags
one of the most commonly deployed microchips in history [5].
Like any widely deployed technology however, RFID has also
attracted the attention of attackers aiming to exploit RFID for
non-legitimate use. As the powerful technology can identify
objects without the line-of-sight requirement, there is an urgent
need for developing effective security measures to protect
RFID tags from compromising confidential information.
The randomized hash-lock protocol, unlike other hash-
based protocols such as hash-lock and hash-chain [6] [7],
has received little or no enhancement since it was proposed.
Perhaps this phenomenon is due to its practicability (compared
to other hash-based scheme). Unlike the scheme in [8] and
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the new protocol proposed here, almost all other authentica-
tion schemes does not allow for mutual authentication to be
completed in just two message exchanges, but at least three to
four exchanges [9] [10] [2] [11] [12] [13] [14] for one-sided
authentication alone. Aside from the above advantage, the
randomized hash-lock protocol also exhibit better performance
over other protocols when used in small RFID networks where
there is only a small amount of tags. The new two-step
authentication protocol proposed thus also best suit situations
where only a relatively small amount of tags are involved.
This paper proposes an authentication scheme that addresses
anonymity, authentication, and confidentiality to some extent,
based on the randomized hash-lock scheme proposed by
Wies et al [8]. We aim to address several most significant
vulnerabilities of RFID technology, such as replay attacks and
full-disclosure. It should be emphasized that authentication is
especially important to the tags employing these protocols, as
it is their functionality that is of most interest to the attackers.
II. RANDOMIZED HASH-LOCK
One of the first proposed, and most frequently discussed and
enhanced protocols ( [6] [7] [15].) is the Hash-Lock protocol
proposed by MIT [8], it has been used as a foundation for
many other protocols such as the Enhanced Authentication
Protocol Based on Hash-Lock proposed by Ouyang et al
[15]. Its low complexity and efficiency has attracted many
researchers to use hash-lock as a starting point of their
research.
The randomized hash-lock was proposed along with the
hash-lock protocol by Weis [8] in 2003. The introduction of a
random number R introduces an additional layer of complexity
to the hash-lock scheme. In order to randomize output of the
tag for every session, the response of the massage has been
lengthen from H(idi) to H(idA, ‖R) , where H, R and id are the
hash function, random number and id of the tag respectively.
As R is a different a random number generated for every
session, H(idi, ‖R) would not be as predictable compared to
H(idi). Similar to H(id*) used in hash-lock, H(idi, ‖R) is used
as a challenge to the reader’s queries. The reader has to return
the tag’s ID as a proof of its legitimacy.
An authentication session is started at the query for
H(idi, ‖R) from the reader, to which a tag has to first generate
a random number R from its embedded random number
generator. Using R, a new challenge message is generated by
combining the original ID and R creating (idA, ‖R), which is
than hashed creating H(idA, ‖R). H(idA, ‖R) is then forwarded
back to the reader as a response. After H(idA, ‖R) has been
received by the reader, the reader queries the ID of all tags in
the database, each ID is combined with R received from the tag
,creating every possible combination of (idi, ‖R). H(idi, ‖R)
is generated for every existing (id*, ‖R) until H(idi, ‖R) =
H(idA, ‖R) in which case the tag is deemed to be authentic.
Consequently if no existing (id*, ‖R) matches H(idA, ‖R),
the session will end with the reader regarding the tag as
illegitimate.
If a tag is deemed to be authentic, the reader will respond to
the tag with (idi where H(idi, ‖R) = H(idA, ‖R) as a response
to its initial challenge H(idA, ‖R). If (idi and (idA has been
compared by the tag and is found to match, the tag would
unlock itself allowing the reader to access it full functionality,
completing the authentication process.
Fig. 1: Randomized Hash-Lock Authentication Process
A. Major Limitations of Randomized Hash-lock
Although randomized hash-lock brings significant benefits
into preventing attacks like tracking, its disadvantages may
very well outweigh its advantages. One of the most signif-
icant changes made that caused deployments to avoid such
implementation is due to the amount of resources required for
the protocol to operate. A reader has to effectively calculate
hashes for records of every single tag ID stored in the back-end
database in order to authenticate only one tag. This process
has to be repeated every time any tag has to be authenticated,
limiting its practicability for all networks except only those
with a small amount of tags.
Due to the inclusion of a random number generator, the
tag requires larger amount of gates to be implemented into its
chip, which in turn increases the price of a tag. But perhaps
this increase would not have much effect on the decision of
deployment, as the randomized hash-lock scheme would not
be a feasible solution in situations that require a large amount
of tags allowing the total cost to be relatively low.
Compared to hash-lock where the ID does not necessarily
have to be stored in the tag, this scheme requires the ID to be
stored in the tag for the authentication process to complete.
Being so makes the ID vulnerable to be extracted by attacks
such as replay and spoofing attacks. It is now possible to
compromise the ID just by eavesdropping a legitimate session,
as the ID is sent as a response to the challenge H(idA, ‖R).
The heavy calculations required before a tag can be au-
thenticated makes this protocol especially vulnerable to DoS
attacks. By simply authenticating with a reader by randomly
generated messages of the required length, the reader would
accept each message as an authentication request and conse-
quently consuming a huge amount of resources. With a large
enough amount of such messages, a DoS can be effectively
launched.
Randomized hash-lock offers little protection against replay
and spoofing attacks. Using only two authentication sessions
an attacker can extract the ID of a tag, and in turn it’s
functionlity. In the initial step, the attacker is required to
query the targeted tag for H(idA, ‖R), using H(idA, ‖R) an
attacker would attempt to establish a connection with a reader.
It is important note that, although H(idA, ‖R) is supposed to
be different every session there are no measures preventing
H(idA, ‖R) to repeat throughout the tag’s lifetime. By re-
playing a captured H(idA, ‖R), the attacker’s authentication
attempt would still be considered genuine. Taking advantage
of this assumption, by replaying a captured H(idA, ‖R) a reader
would accept this as a legitimate challenge and therefore
respond with the ID of the original tag, which is captured
by the attacker for the final step of compromise. The targeted
tag’s full functionality would be unlocked, when the attacker
establishes a new session with the tag, regardless of the tag’s
challenge respond with its ID and be accepted by the tag.
This approach exploits the fact that regardless of the challenge
H(idA, ‖R), there can only be one correct response, which is
the ID of the tag. By replaying this response an one can access
the full functionality of a compromised tag for as long or as
much as one wishes.
Fig. 2: Spoofing and Replay on Randomized Hash-Lock
III. PROPOSED TWO-STEP MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL BASED ON RANDOMIZED HASH-LOCK FOR
SMALL RFID NETWORKS
Similar to the original randomized hash-lock protocol,
where mutual authentication can be achieved in two message
exchanges 1, this protocol also allows for mutual authentica-
tion in two message exchanges but at the same time address
possible points of compromise in the original protocol. By
using the message H(R‖idA) instead of id, prevents id to be
compromised during the authentication process.
The authentication process of this protocol follows similarly
to the randomized hash-lock protocol. Using random number R
1Whenever a tag is able to create an authenticable hash and random number
combination, it is assumed that the tag is authentic. If the reader is able to
respond to its query, replying with its ID, the tag assumes that the reader is
also authentic. Although this is by no means a secure process, it does allow
for mutual authentication under non-hostile circumstances.
generated using the embedded random number generator at the
beginning of every session. Tag A creates message H(idA, ‖R)
as a challenge to the reader.
After H(idA, ‖R) has been received by the reader, the reader
queries the ID of all tags in the database, each ID is combined
with the random numberR received from the tag ,creating
every possible combination of (idi, ‖R) . In order to calculate
H(idi, ‖R). H(idi, ‖R) is generated for every existing (id*, ‖R)
until H(idi, ‖R) = H(idA, ‖R) in which case the tag is deemed
to be authentic. Consequently if no existing (id*, ‖R) matches
H(idA, ‖R), the session will end with the reader regarding the
tag as hostile.
If a tag is deemed to be authentic, the reader will respond to
the tag with H(R‖idA)as a response to H(idA, ‖R). The reader
will be authenticated after the tag has calculated H(R‖idA)
and compared it to the one received from the reader and that
they match.
Fig. 3: Enhanced Protocol Based on Randomized Hash-Lock
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
While many enhancements of protocols, such as the En-
hanced Authentication Protocol Based on Hash-Lock [15],
implements addition steps or process to the existing protocol,
this protocol takes the opposite approach and aims to minimize
additional complexity to the original scheme while enhancing
security. This is clearly evident in the authentication process
of the enhanced protocol. By not implementing any extra
authentication steps, or any other mechanisms such as syn-
chronization, this protocol maintains the clarity of its original
design by inheriting its basic two-step authentication structure.
Whilst some might believe that authentication protocols
with little complexity are inferior to those which have high
complexity, it is not always the case. Whereas complex au-
thentication protocols typically offer more features or claim to
be more robust, the relatively large amount of steps required
for the process to complete creates a larger potential attack
surface, not to mention additional cost due to more complex
circuitry.
Protocols cannot be considered to be secure if it depends on
the obscurity of the choice of hash function, mainly due to the
limited choices currently available for low-cost RFID systems.
Therefore the protocol is developed under the assumption that
all information except the ID of the tag is known by all parties.
The lack of protection for the final message ID sent from
the leaves a more secure response that is resistant to replay,
spoofing and eavesdropping to be desired. As textitH(R‖id*)
is generated with the same elements as H(idA, ‖R) using the
same process, they are of similar cryptographic complexity.
Although it may seem at first that the similarity between R‖id*
and idA‖R seems insignificant, it is not possible to generate
R‖id* using only information in the challenge R, idA‖R even
with the knowledge of the hash function H.
As shown in table I, using the SHA-1 algorithm as an
example, the results of H(R‖id) and H(id‖R) are vastly dif-
ferent, maybe even impossible do draw any similarities just
by looking at the two results. The ID is still used as a ’key’
for unlocking a tag, is no longer used as a direct response
the challenge, but is rather used to generate a message that
requires its knowledge.
Tag ID (id) da4b9237bacccdf19c0760cab7aec4a8359010b0
Random Number (R) 563
H(id‖R) a2567f91877676585b63b8a04c6aaa0eeb26d4fc
H(R‖id) 96db9bd178471821024ca4d1dc3e90f4b37100c4
TABLE I: H(id‖R) and H(R‖id)
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As with any proposed security protocol, it would be in-
teresting to analysis if the proposed protocol offers any real
advantage towards existing security threats. Although one
would be unrealistic to expect any protocol to be perfectly
immune to attacks, especially security protocols for wireless
networks, any advantages compared to older protocols should
always be welcomed.
A. Eavesdropping
It is not feasible to completely prevent eavesdropping on
most wireless networks [16] [17]. Authentication protocols can
only limit the amount of information transmitted though the
physically insecure communication channel [18]. By limiting
as well as encrypting information exchange during authenti-
cation, protocols can decrease the value of information gained
by eavesdropping and therefore lower the favorability of such
attack.
The proposed authentication only requires a total of two
message exchanges 2 allowing the authentication process to be
completed in a relatively short amount of time depending on
the total amount of tags. In addition to the above advantages,
both messages exchanged in the authentication process are
encrypted using a one-way hash function effectively turning
captured messages into useless hashes of randomized strings
if captured. Although the proposed protocol cannot be used
to control any data leakages after a tag has been unlocked, it
is effectively into preventing any information that is of any
interest to attackers to be compromised during authentication.
B. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Having only two instances of messages exchange between
the reader and tag, it is in some way technically impossible
to launch a MITM attack anytime during the authentication
2Excluding the initial reader query, as it is technically not part of the
authentication
process [12]. However as the proposed protocol does not have
any control over communication of a tag after it has been
unlocked, MITM attacks can take advantage of an unlocked
tag after it has been authenticated, as shown in figure 4.
Fig. 4: MITM Attack on the Proposed Protocol
The attack shown in figure 4 is possible mainly due to the
absence of a continuous authentication after the initial authen-
tication procedure. A tag assumes that after it has successfully
authenticated a reader, the subsequent communications are
from that authenticated reader and are therefore authentic.
C. Replay
The proposed protocol can be quite effective into preventing
replay attacks. One of the main weaknesses of the randomized
protocol is due to the use of a non-changing tag ID as a method
of proofing a reader’s authenticity to a tag. Its constant nature
allows this ID to be captured and replayed for all subsequent
authentication sessions, allowing an attacker to continuously
compromise a tag for as long as the ID remains unchanged.
It is no-longer possible in the proposed protocol as a pseudo-
random key H(R‖id*), derived with the knowledge of both
the random number R as well as the ID of the tag, is used
in place of the traditional constant ID. Although the proposed
protocol has major advantages over the tradition randomized
hash-lock protocol in areas of preventing replay attacks on
a tag, it does not offer anything mechanisms into enhancing
security against replay attacks on readers. It is assumed that
the full functionally of a tag is of most interest to an attacker
and consequently the possibility of compromising a reader is
relatively low.
Interestingly, however, the proposed protocol is not per-
fect into preventing replay attacks with one drawback. The
protocol’s security is dependent on the randomness of the
random number generator, as one may realize, H(id‖R) and
H(R‖id) are in reality key pairs. As the only changing variable
of both messages is R. For example, of two sessions, 1
and 2, from the same RFID tag using the proposed proto-
col, where the random numbers generated are (R1 and (R1
respectively, and consequently two challenge-response key
pairs (H(id1, ‖R),H(R‖id1)) and (H(id2, ‖R),H(R‖id2)) would
be created. Generally one would expect the values for the
two pairs to be different, however one could not ignore the
possibility of the same R being generated, effectively reusing
a key-pair more than once. As there are no records of previous
generated numbers, and the creation of such records could
potentially limit number of times tags could be authenticated,
the possibility of the same R being generated grows as the
number of tags continues to expand.
Although there is a theoretically an infinite amount of
combinations possible practical limitations, such as storage
requirements and computational requirements, allow only for
a finite amount. By capturing a large amount of key-pairs,
an attacker can initiate the authentication process until a key
generated by a tag matches a previously captured key-pair.
However an attacker would have to eavesdrop to capture a
considerable amount of key-pairs in order to make this attack
effective. Not worthwhile for most attackers.
D. DoS
Not only does this protocol inherit all the advantages of
the randomized hash-lock scheme, but also inherits some
of the disadvantages as well. DoS attack by flooding is
the most notable examples of such disadvantages. Similar
to the original randomized hash-lock scheme, the proposed
protocol requires the reader to calculate H(id‖R) for every id,
as readers cannot distinguish whether a communicating tag
exists in the connected back-end database until H(id‖R) has
been performed on all existingids.. Although one such hash
calculation might not consume much resources on modern
systems, a large concurrent amount of such operations would
eventually consume all available resources causing the reader
the halt operation [19] [20].
By taking advantage of this characteristic, an attacker can
easily generate random messages of the required length, with
no intention of authenticating with the reader, putting an enor-
mous burden on the reader/database effectively performing a
denial-of-service attack.
E. Tracking
Similar to the randomized hash-lock protocol, this protocol
can be effectively into preventing identity tracking. By utiliz-
ing random response to any reader prior to authentication, it
is no longer possible to identify a tag prior to being authenti-
cated. Traditional tracking exploits the non-changing challenge
message used for authentication. By introducing randomized
authentication challenges, they have become unpredictable to
an attacker an effective mechanism into preventing tracking.
However, the above discussed is under the assumption that
an attacker does not have any knowledge of the ID of the
tag, if an attacker can successfully authenticate with the tag,
tracking cannot be prevented. This scenario is common if the
’attacking’ party is in fact the owner or provider of the tags,
hence they could very possibly have more knowledge about
the tag then their current owners.
It is interesting to note that physical tracking is still possible
as the tag would still respond to readers with its authentication
challenge, allowing the signal to be traced. [11] [21]
F. De-synchronization
The current proposed protocol does not make use of any
synchronization values, and hence there are no possibilities
of such attacks under the current scheme [22]. However
synchronization values could to be included in the future, as
the current protocol have no method of determining whether
the communicating reader is authentic after authentication. A
synchronization value could possibly be used in order for a
tag to keep record of the number of messages since a reader
was authenticated.
G. Full-Disclosure
A full-disclosure attack can be regarded as the compromise
of the ID stored on the tag, as it is the most vital piece of
information required to unlock a tag [14]. As an unlocked
tag would assume a communicating reader is authentic, an
attacker can possibly extract all information from a tag once
it is unlocked.
Although the proposed scheme does not have any obvious
points of exploit that allows for a full-disclosure attack though
the authentication process, it is possible for an attacker to
perform a brute force attack that could reveal the ID of a tag
using the initial challenge message H(id‖R). By computing
all possible values of (R,H(id‖R)) until one finds a match,
however In order for this attack to be successful an attacker
must first be able to identify the length of the ID as well as the
structure of the message (id‖R). For example, if the challenge
message (R,H(id‖R)) represented by hexadecimal strings
(563, a2567f91877676585b63b8a04c6aaa0eeb26d4fc), one
would have to know that the original (id‖R) is in the form of:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXHHH
where Xs represents the hexadecimal ID string and Hs the
random number. By hashing every possible combination, i.e
from 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000563 to
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF563,
an attacker would be able to distinguish the ID of the tag.
However it is important to note that multiple strings can
produce the same hash. Where the length of the ID is longer
than the fixed output length of a hash function it is guaranteed
that there would be multiple IDs with the same hash. Hence
returning to the fact that the proposed scheme is only suited
for deployments where there are only small amount of tags.
H. Cloning
No authentication mechanism can be used to prevent
cloning, but some can offer advantages over others into
preventing attackers from gathering data required for cloning.
In the randomized hash-lock protocol, the ID of the tag is
the signal most critical information one needs in order to
compromise a tag. As mentioned previously, one of the main
concerns over the original randomized hash-lock scheme is
caused by the use the tag’s ID as a key for unlocking the
tag. The ID during transmission is at high risk of being
compromised. This risk can be minimized by using a utilizing
a hashed message, in place of the original, that requires one
to have knowledge of the ID.
However all would fail if an attacker physically possesses
the tag. Using a physically invasive attack, an attacker can
directly extract all information stored in a given RFID tag if
given the correct equipment.
VI. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Aside from security considerations, there also exist practica-
bility concerns. Whilst the proposed protocol offers significant
overall advantages over the existing protocol, is still relatively
early in its lifecycle, below are two issues that could poten-
tially affect security in the future.
A. Memory Requirements
One of the main drawbacks associated with the currently
proposed protocol comes from the fact that it requires nearly
twice the amount of memory than the original. In the random-
ized hash-lock protocol, after the initial challenge message
H(idA, ‖R), the tag no longer have the need to store R as
the only correct response is id and id is typically be stored
in read-only non-volatile memory, where as generated hash
outputs are stored in rewritable volatile memory.
In the original protocol only the id, received from the reader,
or the initial challenge textit H(R‖id*) is required to be stored
in volatile memory at one time. However, as the proposed
protocol uses textit H(R‖id*) in place of just id as a response
to the challenge H(idA, ‖R), H(idA, ‖R), R as well as the
H(idA, ‖R), calculated by the tag, are all required to be stored
into temporary storage memory for the tag to compare them.
For example, if the current hash-function produces a fixed
length 64-byte output, ID is a 48-byte string and R is a 2-
byte random number. The total amount of memory required
for the randomized hash-lock scheme is 66-bytes, a 64-byte
hash output and a 2-byte random number required for the
challenge (R,H(idA, ‖R)), which is considered to be the peak
consumption for throughout the entire authentication process.
Using the proposed protocol, peak consumption is reached
when comparing the response H(R‖id) received by the reader
and H(R‖id) calculated from the tag, consuming a total of
130-bytes given by a total of 2 hash outputs, one from the
reader and one calculated as well as R. The proposed protocol
uses consumes a total of 96% more memory compared to
the original randomized hash-lock protocol, as shown as a
comparison in figure 5.
Fig. 5: Protocol Memory Consumption Comparison
This issue could possibly be avoided by producing shorter
hash outputs3, but doing so would lower the security of the
protocol dramatically. It is important to note that, although
this is considered to be a major issue now rapidly developing
technology will eventually allow larger amounts of memory
to be present on RFID tags at lower cost, in which case this
would no longer be an issue.
3By shrinking the authentication messages by 50%, thus the protocol can
be implemented without the need for additional memory.
B. Finite Key Combinations
As suggested earlier on, (H(id‖R)) and (H(R‖id)) are in fact
key pairs, where only one (H(R‖id)) exists for every possible
value of (H(id‖R)). There can only be as many combinations as
the values possible for R or H depending which has a smaller
set of possible values. Although the chances of R repeating
in a tag’s lifetime are statistically low, one cannot out rule
the possibility of deliberate attacks by refreshing R, though
authentication attempts, until it repeats.
The chances of R repeating increases after every authentica-
tion attempt, as there are one less unique value possible for R.
However, this issue can be addressed by periodically changing
the ID of a tag throughout its lifetime. By changing ID, a new
set of values H(id‖R) can be created. For example, by logging
every successful authentication in the database a trigger could
be created so that id would be refreshed if H(id‖R) has been
used in previous session, or after every predefined number of
successful authentications.
Fig. 6: ID Update Example
Figure 6 outlines the possibility of an ID mechanism dis-
cussed in the above example. Observe that the added steps
for updating ID adds requirements for additional steps to be
implemented in the current scheme. The above is only used as
an example, additional work has to be done in order to ensure
that the updates do not increase the risk of compromise before
such mechanism is implemented.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The proposed protocol addressees most major security con-
cerns relating to the original randomized hash-lock protocol,
especially in preventing replay and full-disclosure attacks.
Introducing a unique response for every possible challenge
has proven to be an effective measure against replay attacks,
which was one of the most vulnerable attacks that randomized
hash-lock was subject to. Similar to the original protocol,
the proposed protocol retains most of the mechanism for
generating random challenges in order to prevent tag tracking.
While the proposed protocol have demonstrated significant
improvement in security, however, it has some small limita-
tions. Several aspects such as higher memory consumption and
possible, but highly unlikely, coincident reuse of key pairs may
slightly hinder its ability to be completely immune to replay
and tracking. Nevertheless, aside from these drawbacks, this
protocol was able to improve most aspects of security dramat-
ically while remaining free of any unnecessary complexity.
As the proposed scheme is still relatively immature, there
are several aspects or ideas that could possibly be developed to
enhance the security further. The main ideas of the proposed
protocol was to address the non-changing challenge response
sent from the reader, allowing the response to be compromised
during transmission. Although the protocol no longer uses a
non-changing challenge response, it is far from randomized
compared to the challenge, as each challenge and response
are effectively key pairs. Only by investigating other key gen-
erating mechanisms can true random challenge and responses
be created.
Finally, future research can look for a method that allow
mutual authentication throughout communication, and not just
limited to authentication only at the initiation of a session. By
requiring authentication after a tag has been unlocked, the risks
of a tag being compromised by spoofing after a reader has been
successfully authenticated can be significantly reduced.
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